Myanmar, one of the biggest ODA recipient countries in Southeast Asia, maintained its good and friendly relations with Japan throughout successive Myanmar governments since independence. The relations between Japan and Myanmar started during 1930s with the hope of promoting the idea that Japan was the potential liberator of Asia while Myanmar was under the British colonial rule during which Myanmar nationalist movement started and inherited. Post-war Japan-Myanmar relations officially started in November 1954 when the two countries signed a Peace Treaty and Myanmar became the first Southeast Asian country to accept Japanese reparations (Nay Chi Htwe, 2016). Its cooperation for social and economic development in Myanmar provided in the form of ODA, which had accounted for about 75% of total aid in Myanmar. But the Japanese ODA policy after 1988 is interesting to find out policy changes and fluctuated trend of aid allocation. At present, Japan’s overall priority was the economic development and maintaining its friendly ties with foreign countries which was one of the characteristics that has been represented under the Yoshida doctrine (Suppakran Pongyelar, 2007). Japanese also believed that it was both effective and practical approach for promoting Myanmar’s overall development and nation-building process which will eventually lead to progress and stability in the region.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are many scholars and researchers who attempt to understand the nature and the objectives of Japanese ODA to Myanmar or to Southeast Asian countries from various aspects. Donald M. Seekins viewed that Japanese aid relations with Myanmar is a special case and he argued the Japanese decision to resume aid to Myanmar indicates the power of domestic interests (Thanyarat Apiwong & Yoshihiro Bamba). Patrick Strefford claims it seems logical to conclude that such an ODA project was a fine example of the continued use of ODA as ‘seed money’ for Japanese private oversea investment and it is despite the ODA reforms that were supposed to have reduced the influence of Japanese companies over ODA disbursal. Whatever the Japanese ODA objectives may be, it seems that the economic and infrastructure development of Myanmar relies on the ODA donor countries especially Japan. (Donald M, 1999). Thus, the objectives of the Japanese ODA towards Myanmar are complicated. It is believed that the Japanese ODA and the economic assistance towards Myanmar often benefited the Japanese businesses. To some extent these claims are true, nonetheless, Japan will continue to play a significant position in Myanmar and it will impact to some extent in the democratization reforms of the country (Kazuo Sunaga, 2004). As many scholars have described the relationship from the Japan’s national interest point of view, there is one factor which has been overlooked or perhaps not attract as much attention as other aspects is the emotional or sentimental factor that has been entrenched since the post-war period. Another factor that should be take into consideration in analyzing the Japan’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with Myanmar is the perceive threat of rise of China’s influence in the country and in the Southeast Asia region. Japan had come to view Myanmar as an important factor in creating an identity independent from the US sphere in Asia. On the other hand, Japan’s Myanmar policy has associated with universal values of human rights, democracy and freedom. This ideology is essential for Japan’s economic growth and to establish themselves as one of the leading political and economic powers of the world (Lam Peng, 2015). Based on these claims, this paper focuses on Japan’s ODA policy towards Myanmar from the aspect of historical ties and emotional factor which exist between the two countries as well as to examine the Japan’s ODA policy patterns based on the domestic and international factors involve in shaping these patterns.

RESEARCH QUESTION

This paper attempts to develop a better understanding of the Japan’s ODA policy implementation pattern in Myanmar from post war to present. This paper also attempts to identify the possible explanations and patterns of Japan’s ODA policy towards Myanmar and what kinds of factors involve in shaping these patterns. (Paramenswaran,2006). In line with these objectives, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: Why the Japan’s ODA policy is important for Japan-Myanmar relations? What are the patterns of Japan’s ODA policy towards Myanmar? What kind of domestic and international factors involve in shaping these patterns?

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATION

 This is qualitative research analyzing the primary sources of surveys conducted by scholars or media or organizations and official government statements and the secondary source of scholarly articles. In order to implement the work of research, there will have limitation in time framework. These researches based on friendly relationship between Myanmar-Japan (Purnendra Jain, 2014). Hence, this research will have been compiled only up to the time of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government.

FINDING AND DISCUSSION

Myanmar-Japan relations with the Analysis of Japan’s ODA Implementation

Historical ties between Myanmar and Japan

When looking back the history of Japanese-Myanmar relations, the governments of both Japan and Myanmar believed that they share specialties, often referred to as a “special relationship”, or a “historically friendly relationship”. This relationship was forged by General Aung San, General Ne Win and other leaders of Myanmar’s independent movement when they were trained by Japanese army officers and has continued ever since (Steinberg & David I, 1990). It has to be acknowledged that in the history of Myanmar’s independence struggle, Japan provided the primary assistance and supported the formation of Burma Independence Army (BIA) in 1941.

Personal ties between leaders of independent Myanmar and Japanese army officers were crucial in building strong bilateral relations between the two countries particularly during the General Ne Win era (1962-1988). Of all the diplomatic corps, only the Japanese ambassador was allowed to meet with General Ne Win after the 1962 military coup. The “Thirty Comrades,” as well as many senior government officials during the Ne Win administration was taught by Japanese army officers and were able to speak Japanese to varying degrees.

After the military coup of 1962, out of all diplomatic corps, only the Japanese ambassador had constant access to General Ne Win (Yin Myo Thu, 2004). In addition to the “Thirty Comrades,” during the Ne Win administration, several ministers and higher-ranking government officials received their education from Japanese army officers and civilians, and they could speak Japanese well. In Japan, there was a “Burmese lobby” situated in Tokyo. The lobby included figures such as Nobusuke Kishi (former prime minister), Shintaro Abe (former foreign minister) Watanabe Michio (successor to the Nakasone faction of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Yoshiko Yamaguchi (LDP member). They were close friend of General Ne Win. Four Japanese prime ministers officially visited Myanmar in the 1960s and 1970s, while general Ne Win visited Japan several times.

On the other hand, veterans played an important role in nurturing the ‘‘special relationship.’’ Between 1941 and 1945, up to190,000 Japanese soldiers died in Myanmar and groups of Japanese veterans came to Myanmar every year to gradually visit the country to pray at the graves of fallen comrades. Japan’s feelings of strong emotional attachment towards Myanmar is not only the remains of the war veterans were located in Myanmar (more Japanese soldiers died in Myanmar than in any other Southeast Asian Countries) but also how the Myanmar people treated the Japanese soldiers during the occupation which was with sincere kindness and helped them whenever they can despite subjugated by the Japanese. Professor Donald Seekins who wrote many articles on japan-Myanmar relations, commented that during that period, many Japanese who visited Myanmar as technical advisers, diplomats, war veterans had remarkable attitude towards Myanmar people. In japan, they were called biru-kichi Biruma-kichigai, crazy about Myanmar) and their personal network partly promoted cooperation between two nations.

The Japan-Myanmar Cultural association was formed in 1970 by around 2,000 veterans of the Japanese Imperial Army (as an emotional factor that and a significance in the Japanese commitment to Myanmar) and registered with MOFA as a social association (Shadan Houjin) in 1974. The Association has also functioned as a research think-tank on Myanmar to Japanese public and private sectors. Later, veteran descendants, businessmen, intellectuals and general public joined as the association’s members. The association’s objectives were not only cultural promotion but also included strengthening economic and social relationship with governments and people of both countries, and lobbying for policy engagement towards Myanmar.

Other analysts also point out the commonality of Buddhism in their respective cultures was important factor for two countries. Despite the differences in the two school of Buddhism Mahayana in Japan and Theravada in Myanmar many Japanese also felt a strong sense of shared Buddhist values. Their social ethics are similar, emphasizes family relationship and responsibility. Likewise, in Myanmar, despite being occupied by Japan and had experienced horrible war memories, it’s hard to find any anti-Japanese sentiments like in other Southeast Asia countries. Mainly because it is related with the Buddhist beliefs of Myanmar people which has been taught at the very young age of the basic teachings of Buddha. One of the teachings said not to revenge, pardon even your enemy. This religious belief might explain the attitude of Myanmar towards Japan and the “special relationship” that exist between the two countries.

Postwar Economic Ties and ODA

Economic cooperation between Japan and Myanmar started in the form of reparation after the signing of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Myanmar and the Agreement for Reparations and economic cooperation in on 5th November 1954. The 1954 agreement on Reparation and economic cooperation stated Japan would take possible measures to facilities economic cooperation between two countries apart from the reparation payments. Agreement under which Myanmar received $250 million during the period from 1955 to 1965, which helped in developing productive relations between the two countries. Additionally, Japan has provided various forms of economic assistance such as grants for general usage, culture, increasing food production and debt relief in the following years. A large part of the aid was used for the construction of the Baluchaung Dam in Kayar state and four major industrialization projects. The Baluchang hydropower plant was the largest post-war project that the Japanese supported, which meets 40% of Myanmar’s total power supply.

General Ne Win’s centrally controlled economy under the name of ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ resulted in isolating the country. During the period of isolation, Japan had played an important role in sustaining the General Ne Win government. From the beginning of 1970s, the Japanese aid began to increase when General Ne Win opened up the economy to deal with the political and economic problems. General New Win considered Japan to be less threating due to its non-interfering foreign policy. This helped in enhancing the Japanese influence in Myanmar. So much so that the Japanese ambassadors were the only diplomats having direct access to General Ne Win. In 1976 the Burma Aid Group met for the first time in Tokyo. After that, ODA inflows to Myanmar increased sharply. Between 1978 and 1988, Myanmar received US$3,712.3 million in assistance. It is widely considered that without such enormous aid Ne Win Administration would not have survived the several economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. Japan’s ODA accounted for 70% of the total ODA received by Myanmar between 1976 and 1988. Myanmar has consistently been ranked within the top ten largest recipients of the Japanese ODA. The two nations’ bilateral ties were reinforced by these numerous amounts of ODA aid from Japan. In addition, Japanese firms, working with development projects, not only promoted their business ties but also developed friendly relationship with Myanmar people.

Military Government and Japanese ODA policy approach

To control the political situation in Myanmar, a military government under the name of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was set up. Initially Myanmar thought that Japan would continue giving aid because of the close relations during the previous government. Myanmar was surprised when Japan stopped its aid in 1989. The suspension of ODA provision was due to pressure from Western allies, particularly the US, which opposed any measures that would benefit the military government. The lack of Japanese aid caused the most serious impact on Myanmar government and economy. But after five months, Japan government decision to recognize the military government in Myanmar and believed that this would encourage the military government to hold multi-party democratic elections. In 1990, the Japanese announced to give US$33.3 million as debt-relief grant in order to reward the SLORC announced its decision to conduct the election in the form of humanitarian assistance. Thus, Japan has been always in-search of an opportunity to increase its aid to Myanmar and Japan tried to encourage the military government to undertake reforms so that they could justify their decision to continue aid to Myanmar. However, due to US sanction policy and opposition to Japanese ODA projects in Myanmar, the Japanese ODA was thoroughly inspected and did not go smoothly as expected.

To this connection, Japan government labeled the “new” loan aid as “humanitarian” and it was followed by gradual release of aid projects on a “case-by-case” basis. The Japanese government responds pragmatically depending on improvements of human rights records in the country.  For example, in 1995, when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, paved the way for Japan to announce to re-start its ODA policy to meet humanitarian needs of the people in Myanmar. In 1998, Japan announced that it would give US$ 20 million for the expansion of Yangon International Airport. The Japanese government also tried to mediate between the military government and the Western countries, trying to convince Myanmar to accept assistance from these countries.

Japan’s Re-Engagement with Myanmar

The historic election in 2010, where U Thein Sein formed the government was an important marked the beginning of a new chapter in Japan-Myanmar economic relationship. In 2011, when most of the Western countries announced the lifting of the sanctions and started renewing their ties with Myanmar, Japan, which had hugely invested in Myanmar, quickly jumped in to take their opportunity. The economy had stagnated during the two decades of military rule due to the sanctions imposed by the Western countries, which had affected infrastructural development as well as training of the work force.  With Shinzo Abe becoming the prime minister in 2012, Myanmar pledged a loan of US$ 942 million to show their support for the reforms in Myanmar. In 2013, Shinzo Abe visited Myanmar to announce Japan’s decision of wavering off the debt of US$ 1.74 billion and also ODA loan US$ 503 million for three projects. During Abe’s term, there has been a flow of investments along with wavering off debt. In 2014, Myanmar became the largest recipient of Japanese aid. Shinzo Abe is the son of the Shintaro Abe and Kishi Nubusuke, who were part of the “Burma lobby”, so he is eager to develop close relations with Myanmar.

The 2015 election was a milestone in Myanmar’s democratic process, and won by the NLD party, gave Japan more impetus to improve its relationship with Myanmar.  Initially, the Japanese government was skeptical about the NLD’s approach towards Japan, for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was critical about the Japanese engagement with the military government. Hence, the Japanese government started having talks with the NLD members and promised to fully support Myanmar democratic process. The visit of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who is the State Counsellor as well as the foreign minister, to Japan in November 2016, put to rest all suspicions and requested Japan for economic assistance for Myanmar’s development. During this visiting, Abe promised 800 billion yen over a period of five year for peace building and development efforts. Out of these 40 billion yen is to use for the development of ethnic minorities in Myanmar. The main intention behind this visit was to convince Japan about the improved investment opportunities in Myanmar, which would enable more and more Japanese companies to invest in the country. The amount of aid that the Japan has providing to Myanmar is huge compared to Japan’s support for democracy in other countries.

Analysis of Japan’s Myanmar policy

In the above section, this paper covered historical events and consequences of Japanese policy implementation towards Myanmar. To understand such policy driving of Japan, this part would examine the internal and external factors behind which influence the policy.

China Factor

Since 1989, China has been an important Myanmar’s supporter when Western countries-imposed trade embargos on the country. The two countries have since then fostered strong relationships in terms of politics and economy. Both countries held several historical top leader visits. These diplomatic visits and interactions show the strong interest China has for its Southern neighbor and its importance to the military government. Chinese influence in Myanmar is so overwhelming that it made particular protection of Myanmar together with Russia to veto the US-drafted UN resolution calling on Myanmar to end its authoritarian power and move towards democracy. Additionally, China has expanded its leverage over the Southeast Asian region by means of road, railway, waterway and port infrastructures. Such strategic development of China threatens India, Southeast Asian countries, and the external power, the US and of course, Japanese interests. The countries affected by the growing influence of China in the region take very high concern of their policy towards Myanmar and Southeast Asia in general.

In Myanmar, Japan needed to maintain its position, in order to prevent the military government from coming under the complete influence of its competitor, China. Therefore, Japan has made several approaches to ensure its influence in economic progression and military security in the country. For example, Japan announced its first partial resumption of aid shortly after Chinese Premier Lee Peng visited Yangon in December 1994. In March 1997, Beijing announced a new economic cooperation agreement along with a 70-million-yen loan to Yangon. This alarmed the Japanese officials who believed that the objective of China’s “aid offensive” in Myanmar was to gain naval access to the Indian Ocean. Subsequently, in the same year the Japanese government announced its formal support for Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN. Japan believed that the policy of isolation would further push Myanmar towards China. As a result, whenever the military government took steps towards initiating a dialogue with the NLD or release political prisoners, Japan quickly announced more aid. Hence, Japan’s ODA was a strategic tool to increase its economic influence in Myanmar.

Southeast Asia has a significant importance to Japan in multiple aspects. Its interests lie in access to Southeast Asia’s resources for its resource security, the benefits provided by Southeast Asian market and investment networks. Japan is the biggest trading partner and the largest source of foreign investment for many Southeast Asian countries. Regardless of what others claims to the motive for Japanese ODA, according to the objectives of the revised 2003 Japan’s ODA Charter, the first priority for Japan is to provide support for peace and development in developing countries so that they can ensure their own security and socio-economic development. Therefore, Japan must establish relations with Southeast Asian countries to enhance its role, politically as well as economically, in the region and enhancing the ties with the Southeast Asian countries means that it could counterbalance China’s presence and its dependence on the US.

US- Japan Relations and impact of Japan’s Myanmar policy

US-Japan relations are another factor in Japan’s Myanmar policy. During the Cold War, the two countries came to a mutual agreement which allowed Japan to focus on its own economic and trade development while having its security guaranteed by the US. This agreement also meant that Japan was able to conduct trades with China despite the American embargo, and establish relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, Japan was able to reestablish economic ties with Southeast Asian countries without US interference through American initiatives.

After the end of the Cold War, Japan has had to weigh its own national interests and its relationship with the US in order to gain the best for its national interests as the US emerged as the sole global superpower after the collapse of the Communist system. Japan became gradually concerned about its own national security due to its overwhelming dependence on the US and US pressure in foreign policy-making. Thus, it began to create new approaches to international affairs cautiously.

Japan’s foreign policy with Myanmar was flexible to some extent and balanced between pro-engagement policy and America’s pro-embargo camp. However, Japan usually gave explanations to US for continuing relationship with the military government because of its important and traditional strategic and economic alliance. Therefore, when political situation changed in Myanmar, Japan Government labeled the “new” loan aid as “humanitarian” and it was followed by gradual release of aid projects on a “case-by-case” basis, focusing on “ongoing projects suspended since 1988. However, Japan still supports Myanmar in diplomatic matters despite the discontent of US. Clear examples are the Hashimoto’s support for Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, and aid continuation programs. Japan’s alliance with the U.S. did not always has influence over Japan’s policy towards Myanmar or on the aid policy, for instance, in 2006, when the U.S. attempted to introduce a resolution to UN Security Council against military government of Myanmar to change its repressive policies however, the attempt failed due to the objections of China, Russia and Japan also joined them because Japan believed that it did not pose any threat to international peace and security. In this case U.S criticized Japan’s decision as morally wrong. Hence, now Myanmar is on its journey to transforming the country to democratic one.

There were mainly three strategic reasons behind the close relationship of Japan with Myanmar and ASEAN. The first reason is that Myanmar is an important front-line to maneuver diplomatic relations with China and to create an identity independent from US influence. Another factor is Japan has always been wary of relations between the US and China. During the Nixon’s administration, the US announced its continuation of most-favored- nation treatment to China without any requirement for a substantial improvement in human rights, because it realized sizable economic interests in China. Japan as well as other Asian countries viewed that the US handled various matters of economic and commercial, human rights, environment, drug and nuclear proliferation policies differently based on its own interests. The third reason is that, as the US shifts towards Asia to improve economic relations with China, it could endanger Japan’s objective to become the mediating figure in the region. These are important reason why Japan moved towards closer relationship with ASEAN as well as Myanmar.

Japanese ideology of universal values of human rights, democracy and freedom

Needless to say, Japan’s Myanmar policy has associated with universal values of human rights, democracy and freedom. The ideology is important for Japan to become one of the world leaders in international political and economic arena. Since the end of WWII, Japan has shifted from an authoritarian to a leading figure of universal human rights, democracy and freedom through US’s policy of the two Ds, democratization and demilitarization along with its peace constitution. By imposing universal values and establishing political and economic close ties with the US, Japan has made significant progress in restoring its war-torn economy which would rival the US within a very few decades.

To further increase international leadership, Japan sought to help resolve international conflicts through its “soft power” ODA and establish itself as a political mediator. The ODA has become the main tool of the Japanese government to ensure its national interests and due to its limitations on the use of military force since WWII. Therefore, Japan became the world’s top ODA donor in the early 1990s. Consequently, using its status as the top ODA donor country, Japan can influence the aid recipient countries. There were criticisms that Japan’s ODA trend has been mainly for the pursuit of Japanese national interest as well as for the commercial gain more than the benefits of the ODA recipient countries. This led to the adjustment of Japan’s ODA policy and ODA charter towards universal values in 1992. Thus, the Japanese government announced that it would approve no new project apart from new debt-relief and humanitarian aid projects to emphasize human rights support.

CONCLUSION

Since the war reparations agreement was signed between Japan and Myanmar, Japan has the major provider of ODA and encouraged Myanmar to reform its economy in 1980s. Japanese government has maintained its engagement policy toward Myanmar. Furthermore, Japan’s ODA also played a significant role in the relationship by strengthening the existing close relations between Japan and Myanmar. Under the military regime, Japanese government has maintained its ODA policy and responds pragmatically depending on the situations such as political stability, improvement of human rights records in the country. Therefore, Japanese government encourages reforming Myanmar’s political system from military to civilian government and democratization in Myanmar.

On the other hand, Japan’s ODA is the only means for Japan to play as a main political player and influence the regions because Japan cannot exercise military power to coerce other states according to the Article 9 of the constitution drafted the WWII. There were also criticisms that objectives of Japan’s ODA trend have been mainly for the pursuit of Japanese national interests. However, the assumption of Japan’s ODA has not been for the benefit of the recipient countries is somewhat exaggerated. In the case of Myanmar, Japan government has been concentrating on country’s democratization reforms, saying that Japanese government more emphasize on the prosperity of the Myanmar people rather than the profit of Japanese companies to further strengthen its relationship. As the same time, Japan’s alliance with the U.S. did not always has influence over Japan’s policy towards Myanmar and it also balances the presence of China in the region. Japanese foreign policy toward Myanmar did not serve US interests nor inform the US which is a clear indication that it has more autonomy than realized. In the historical point of view, it can be seen that, there were little or no hiccups in the relationship that had discernable effects on the two countries. Japan and Myanmar have enjoyed the friendly relations based on the strong historical ties. By assessing these factors, it is found that Japan-Myanmar relationship can be referred to as “special relationship”.

Area for further research

This research described the Japan’s ODA to Myanmar has strengthened the existing friendly relations between the two countries. While this paper analysis the historical background of Japan-Myanmar relations and the roots of Japanese ODA policy towards Myanmar, there are several areas for future research that would strengthen this case study. The first area would be a case study on Japanese ODA implementation in Myanmar from 2016 to 2021 using the same framework of this research. Therefore, a way to build upon the research of this paper would be to assess the extent of the NLD’s cooperation with Japan.

A second area of research involves analyzing Japan’s respond to Myanmar’s 2021 military coup. After the 1988 military coup in Myanmar, Japan stopped its aid in 1989. However, five months later, the Japanese government decided to recognize the military government, believing that this would encourage the military government to hold multi-party democratic elections. However, due to the sanctions policy of the United States, Japan's ODA support did not go as smoothly as expected. The Japanese government tried to negotiate between the military government and the West, while the Japanese government labeled the new loan aid as humanitarian. Japan’s policy approach response to the 2021 military coup was similarly as well.